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In the

upreme Court of the State of Utah
rATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Case No.
8756

DW ARD E. McHENRY,
Defendant and Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant, Edward E. McHenry, was convicted on
ne 29th day of April, 1957, of having committed the crime
f robbery on the 16th day of February, 1957, in Salt Lake
:ity. He was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for an
ndeterminate term.
There is no question that a robbery was committed on
he day and at the place alleged. The evidence admitted
ndicated the following facts: That on the above mentioned
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16th day of February, 1957, Wallace E. Naylor, Gener.
Manager of the Safeway Store, located at 17th South an
4th East, was robbed in the morning hours between 7:0
and 8 :00 a. m. by two masked men, each carrying guru
Their apparent means of entry was through a hole cut i:
the roof. The questions raised on appeal go to the identifj
cation of the defendant and to the admission of certaiJ
evidence which it is alleged was prejudicial.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
IT WAS NOT ERROR FOR THE COURT TO
ADMIT EVIDENCE OF A FORMER OFFENSE.
POINT II.
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN
ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF THE OWNERSHIP OF THE MERCURY AUTOMOBILE.
POINT III.
IF THE EVIDENCE RELATING TO THE
AUTOMOBILE WAS INADMISSIBLE, IT WAS
NOT PREJUDICIAL TO THE SUBSTANTIVE
RIGHTS OF THE DEFENDANT.
POINT IV.
IT WAS NOT ERROR TO ADMIT STATEMENTS OF THE DEFENDANT MADE TO
POLICE OFFICERS.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
IT WAS NOT ERROR FOR THE COURT TO
ADMIT EVIDENCE OF A FORMER OFFENSE.
During the trial evidence of a previous crime com.tted at the same store five days earlier and under somelat similar circumstances was admitted over objection.
was offered for the purpose of identifying the defendant.
In the law of evidence it is a general rule that evidence
a separate and independant crime is inadmissible to
ove the guilt of a person on trial for a criminal offense.
1ere are, however, several exceptions to the rule which
e as uniformly accepted as the rule itself, one being that
1ere evidence of a previous crime tends to aid in identifyg the accused as the person who committed the crime in
1estion, it is admissible even though it tends to show the .
lilt of the accused of the other crime for which he is not
. trial. Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 12th Edition, Vol.
Sec. 181.
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Martin, (1917
tab), 164 P. 500, a case cited in appellant's brief, recogzed the above rule and the exception thereto. The case is
,t comparable factually and is therefore not analyzed
~re.

In overruling the defendant's objection to the admission
evidence of the previous offense, the trial judge said at
~ge 17 of the trial record :
"THE COURT: The objection is overruled, but
the Court will limit the effect of the evidence.
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"Mr. Child has stated in his opening statem
that the defendant was recognized by virtue oJ
chance to observe him at the prior event, and :
the purposes of identification the Court will let
the evidence concerned an earlier robbery or en1
into the store.
"But you are not to assume-that is, consi£
that evidence for any purpose other than identifit
tion of the person who entered on the 16th day
February. The defendant is not being tried fort
event that happened the week before.
"But if that event assists somebody in identiJ
ing him, the theory is that he was in once and S;J
he was back again, and indicated he was the sat
man, and if that is all connected up you may co
sider it on the subject of identification."
The evidence as admitted at trial made direct connectio
in two instances between the offense of the 16th of Fe
ruary, the offense charged, and the previous offense oft:
11th of February, 1957. The 11th of February was a Mo
day and the 16th a Saturday. Mr. Naylor, the robbe:
victim, testified as to admissions made to him by the d
fendant. See page 14 of the trial record. The witne~
after describing his arrival at the store and being accosu
by the men, testified as follows :
"They said, 'This time we are back for ever
thing.'"
And further, on the same page :

"* * * the one fellow said 'We want all tl
money this time.' He said, 'the last time you lit
to us.'··
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is testimony was significant as indicating that the men
nmitting the robbery on the 16th of February had prev1sly committed a robbery at the same place and in the
~sence of this witness. Later in the trial Officer Fillis
tified as to statements which the accused had made to

n:
"I asked him how many robberies he had committed. He stated 'The one today, and the one last
Monday.'"
lefendant objected but was overruled.)
"A. His answer was two, 'the one today and
the one last Monday.'
"Q. Did you ask him specifically as to what
robbery he meant as to last Monday?
"A. I said, 'The Safeway store', and he said
'Yes.'"
e page 152 of the trial record. These admissions and con:;sions by the defendant, together with the similarity of
e two offenses, constitute sufficient connection of the two
fenses, and, therefore, furnish ground to admit evidence
the former offense for the purpose of identifying the
fend ant.
In the New York decision of People v. Thau (1916 New
>rk), 113 N. E. 556, a problem similar to the one at hand
ts in issue. The defendant had been convicted of assault
d evidence had been admitted at trial, over objection, that
e defendant had, approximately two weeks previous, comitted a crime at the same location as the offense charged.
te defense had been an alibi. The court said at page 557:
"The defense of an alibi raised in the most direct manner possible an issue as to the identity of
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the person who assaulted the complainant on th~
15th of September. Any fact tending to show tha1
the complainant was not mistaken in alleging tha1
that person was the defendant was relevant to tha1
issue. If the defendant to the knowledge of the com.
plainant had visited his shop within a fortnight and
had then criminally destroyed some of his goods, that
fact would be likely so to impress the mind of the
complainant as to lessen the probability that he was
mistaken concerning the identity of his assailant on
the 15th of September. * * *"
In People v. Stathas (1934 Illinois), 190 N. E. 661, two
defendants were convicted of having robbed a bank on
August 18, 1932. Two bank employees testified that they
had seen the defendants enter the bank. They were able
to identify the defendants in the courtroom. Both employees further testified that they recognized the defendants
as being the persons who robbed the bank on May 25, 1932,
three months prior to the date of the offense charged. The
identity of the defendants became a prime issue. The following is quoted from the court's opinion :
"It is urged that the testimony of the cashier
and his brother tended to show a distinct, substantive offense committed by one or both of the defendants on May 25, and that the admission of such
evidence was therefore improper and very prejudicial to the defendants' case. The general rule is that
evidence of a distinct, unrelated crime is not admissible upon the trial of a defendant charged with the
commission of a criminal offense. There is, however,
an exception to this rule generally recognized by the
courts and text-writers. Such exception is that, when
the evidence offered tends to prove the identity of
the person who committed the crime for which he is
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on trial, or that he was present at and where the
crime was committed, such evidence is competent.
Such evidence is also proper to meet or rebut the
defense of alibi. The rule deducible from the authorities is that, if such evidence is material and relevant, even though it tends to prove the perpetration
of another unrelated and separate criminal offense
on the part of a defendant, the court may properly
receive such testimony. * * *"
In Warren v. State (1941 Tenn.), 156 S. W. 2d 416,
e court has stated the general rule regarding the admism of evidence of a previous offense. The case involved
robbery where the issue of identification was raised. The
urt said:
"The general rule that evidence of separate and
independent crimes is inadmissible to prove the guilt
of a person upon trial for a criminal offense is subject to a well-defined exception with respect to proof
of the identity of the accused. The broad rule is that
where evidence tends to aid in identifying the accused as the person who committed the particular
crime under investigation, it is admissible, in spite
of the fact that it tends to show that the accused is
guilty of other crimes for which he is not on trial.
This rule is applied in a wide variety of cases, such
as arson, burglary, homicide, larceny, liquor law
violations, robbery, and many other instances. It is
permissible, in those instances where evidence is
admitted of the commission of another similar crime
for the purpose of showing identity, for the accused
to introduce in evidence the record of a court showing his trial and acquittal of such other crime.

* * *"
:e also People v. Thompson (1950 Ill.), 94 N. E. 2d 349.
tere is an extensive annotation at 42 A. L. R. 2d 862, re-
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lating to the admissibility in robbery prosecutions of evidence of other robberies.
It is important to note that in this case the problem
of identity was of great importance. The two individuals
who committed the robbery wore masks during all of the
time they were observed by the victim. Five days previous
two masked persons had entered this same store and committed the crime of robbery. There were strong indications,
above recited, that the same persons committed both crimes.
It was therefore necessary that evidence of the previous
crime be used for the purposes of identification.
Any misunderstanding on the part of the jury as to the
effect of the evidence of the previous crime was cured by
the court's statement in overruling the objection, above
quoted, and in the court's Instruction No. 5E.
"You are instructed that evidence has been introduced in this case concerning a robbery alleged
to have taken place on the 11th day of February,
1957, which was allegedly committed by the defendant, Edward E. McHenry, on the person and property of Wallace E. Naylor and Oliver M. Nickel.
Said evidence is not to be considered by you as showing or tending to show that the defendant, Edward
E. McHenry, robbed Wallace E. Naylor on the 16th
day of February, 1957, but can only be used by you
in determining the manner of the identification of
the said Edward E. McHenry by the said Oliver M.
Nickel and Wallace E. Naylor."
POINT II.
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN
ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF THE OWNERSHIP OF THE MERCURY AUTOMOBILE.
In appellant's brief, Point 2, it is argued that evidence
concerning the ownership of a Mercury automobile was inSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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rnissible. Officer Burton, testifying for the state, related
cricumstances of his discovering, shortly after the time
the robbery, a 1957 Mercury automobile, a short distance
>m the Safeway store. Over the objection that the evince was hearsay, he was allowed to testify that the car
d "temporary stickers" bearing the name of the defennt. See trial record, pages 129 and 130. The testimony is
:o related on pages 4 and 5 of appellant's brief.
l

Appellant asserts that this evidence was hearsay and
inadmissible. There are two approaches to this
oblem. The officer's testimony in relating that he saw
~ sticker and testifying as to the name thereon is not a
)lation of the hearsay rule. In Section 249, Wharton's
iminal Evidence, 12th Edition, it is stated:
~refore

"If the witness makes a statement on the basis
of his own observations and not because he was told
or informed by another person, his statement is not
hearsay. Thus, it is not hearsay for the coroner
who had performed the autopsy on the body to state
whether there was any kind of tag on the body at
the time he performed the autopsy, since the presence or absence of a tag was a fact which he would
know of his own observations."

condly, the evidence as to the sticker and name thereon
:ty be admitted as a public record; therefore, an exception
the hearsay rule. The Officer testified that the car was
1ew 1957 model and that it had "temporary stickers." The
nporary stickers he referred to are "temporary permits"
ovided for in the Utah Motor Vehicle Act, Section 41-1-18,
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U. C. A. 1953, providing for the registration of a new automobile. Section 41-1-18 provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person to drive or
move or for an owner knowingly to permit to be
driven or moved upon any highway any vehicle of
a type required to be registered hereunder which
is not registered or for which a certificate of title
has not been issued or applied for, or for which the
apropriate fee has not been paid when and as required hereunder, except that when application accompanied by proper fee has been made for registration and certificate of title for a vehicle it may
be operated temporarily pending complete registration upon displaying a temporary permit duly verified, or other evidence of such application, or otherwise under rules and regulations promulgated by
the commission." (Emphasis added.)

A "temporary permit" required by the act to be displayed
is in the nature of an official or public document. It is a
general rule that a record made for public use is admissible
in evidence as an exception to the hearsay evidence rule as
evidence of the truth of the statements therein made. See
Section 272, Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 12th Edition.
It has frequently been held that names, tags, license

numbers, etc., attached to property may be admitted as
raising a presumption of ownership of the property. "Thus,
the name or number marked on a shop, a ship, a railroad
car, or other chattel or structure may be admissible to show
that person's ownership or control." Section 150a, Wigmore
on Evidence, 3rd Edition. It is a general rule that the fact
that an automobile was registered in a person's name, or
that it bore his license plates at a certain time creates a
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resumption that he was the owner. See Annotation in 103
. L. R. 138. In the Utah case, Ferguson v. Reynolds
1918), 176 P. 267, an action for injuries caused by an
1tomobile striking the plaintiff. The court had before it
te question of the ownership of the automobile that caused
te injury. Evidence had been offered identifying the
1tomobile by the license number it bore. The court comlented on the existing Utah law requiring the owners of
lOtor vehicles to register the same with the Secretary of
tate. The court said at page 267 :
"Defendants' counsel insist that the evidence is
insufficient to sustain the verdict. In this connection, counsel contend that the applications made to
and filed with the Secretary of State are not sufficient to establish the ownership of the car. We are
unable to conceive why our statute was adopted if
it was not for the purpose of furnishing at least
prima facie evidence of the ownership of motor vehicles. * * * We think the courts generally
hold that the applications and numbers or certificates issued under statutes like ours constitute prima
facie evidence that the applicant is the owner of the
vehicle which is identified in the application. Under
our statute the number issued to one owner may not
be transferred, nor, in case the vehicle is sold to
another, can the number be transferred to the transferee. Nor can the number issued for one vehicle be
transferred to another vehicle. If therefore the person making the application for registry is found
using the vehicle described in the application and
which bears the number issued by the Secretary of
State for such vehicle, it certainly constitutes some
substantial evidence that such person is the owner
of the vehicle so described and which bears such
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number. * * * In Berry, Automobiles (2d Ed)
§ 609, the author, in referring to this subject, says:
" 'Evidence that the automobile which caused
the plaintiff's injuries displayed a certain license
number, and that this number was registered in the
office of the Secretary of State in the defendant's
name as owner, makes out a prima facie case of
ownership in the defendant.'"
Here the Mercury automobile was new and, therefore, had
the temporary permits as required by statute. In such case
it is only reasonable to apply the same rule as in situations
where identification is made by way of a license number.
On this point appellant relies heavily on a recent Utah
case, Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Company v. Chugg
(Utah), 315 P. 2d 277. The facts of that case are clearly
distinguishable from the circumstances relating to the identification of the automobile here. There the court was
faced with the problem of whether a sample of blood taken
to determine alcoholic content was the same blood taken
from the defendant on a previous occasion. There the problem of identity was of extreme importance because of the
likelihood of confusing one test tube of blood for another,
and because the blood might be handled and examined by
any number of persons within the hospital or laboratory.
Here the "sticker" on the automobile is similar to a license
plate on a car or a tag on luggage. When attached to property of this nature, the tag, plate, or sticker raises the
presumption of ownership.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
POINT III.
IF THE EVIDENCE RELATING TO THE
AUTOMOBILE WAS INADMISSIBLE, IT WAS
NOT PREJUDICIAL TO THE SUBSTANTIVE
RIGHTS OF THE DEFENDANT.
Section 77-42-1, U. C. A. 1953, provides that the commission of error by the trial court will not be presumed to
have resulted in prejudice, and that a cause will not be
reversed for error unless that error effects the substantial
rights of the party. See also, State v. Neal (1953), 262 P.
2d 756, and State v. Jttstensen, 99 P. 456. Even in the absence of testimony relating to the automobile, there was
sufficient evidence to support the conviction of the defendant. This court has held that the erroneous admission of
evidence does not call for reversal of the judgment where
the guilt of the accused is otherwise satisfactorily proved.
State v. Cox, 276 P. 166.

POINT IV.
IT WAS NOT ERROR TO ADMIT STATEMENTS OF THE DEFENDANT MADE TO
POLICE OFFICERS.
As to this problem, it is necessary to relate from the
record the circumstances of the interrogation. See Trial
Record, pages 149 through 155. The crime was committed
at about 7:30 to 8:00 in the morning and the defendant was
apprehended almost immediately afterwards and taken directly to the interrogation office of the Police Department.
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There, in the presence of two police officers, one of whom
testified at the trial, he was questioned. The police officer
witness testified that the interrogators were identified as
police officers; that the defendant was informed that he
was under arrest; that he had the right to counsel, and
that anything he said might be used against him. See page
151 of the Trial Record. Thereafter, upon inquiry, the defendant stated that he had committed the robbery that day
and the previous robbery on the Monday before.
Appeal is made on two grounds. First, that there was
no foundation laid for the admission of the confession; and,
second, that the confession was not voluntary.
The evidence as to time and place and that defendant
was advised of his rights serve as sufficient foundation.
This court, in the case of State v. Crank, (1943 Utah), 142
P. 2d 178, where the question of the admissibility of a confession was raised, said at page 185:

"* * * In laying a foundation for offering
the writing, if a written confession, or the conversation, if an oral confession, the state will of course
be required to show the time and place of the conversation, or the writing and signing of the instrument, and also what is generally called a prima facie
showing that it was the free and voluntary act of
the accused. * * *"
The prosecutor satisfied the requirements of laying a foundation as above prescribed; the time and place were shown.
That defendant was advised of his rights and that there
was no evidence of compulsion or coercion suffices as a
prima facie showing of voluntariness.
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The extent of the compulsion or coercion applied in
obtaining the confession as alleged by appellant is quoted
from the Trial Record on pages 6 and 7 of appellant's brief.
The quoted testimony is found on pages 152, 153 and 160
of the Trial Record. The issue of the voluntariness of a
confession has been dealt with extensively by this court.
In State v. Johnson (1938 Utah), 83 P. 1010, it was said:

"* * * In determining whether a confession
was voluntary there must be taken into consideration the age and intelligence of the witness, the
place and conditions under which the statement was
made, the circumstances that invoked the conversation, as well as the nature, content, and import of the
statement itself. The court held the statement voluntary and we find no error therein.
"'A confession is involuntary where the installation of fear or a promise of benefit, related to the
legal consequences as regards accused, conveyed by
another for the purpose of obtaining the confession,
has so acted on the will of the confessor as to fetter
the freedom of choice on the matter of whether he
or she should confess. The actuating element which
must move the will of the accused to confess is an
inherent freedom of choice not influenced by fear
or hope induced by another for the purpose of obtaining the confession. Whether such freedom of
choice has been so interfered with by the conduct of
another is a question of fact to be determined from
the evidence.' We think the trial court is in a better
position to determine whether advantage was taken
of a defendant to obtain a confession in a way not
countenanced by the law. * * *"
In this case the circumstances surrounding defendant's
confession do not show an atmosphere of coercion or com-
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pulsion. Defendant was questioned immediately after he
was apprehended. He was advised of his rights to counsel
and that anything he said might be used against him. The
questioning was extremely brief and it appears from the
trial record that defendant made his statements in response
to the officer's first inquiry. Defendant's claim that the
confession was inadmissible is apparently based on a statement which Officer Fillis is alleged to have made at the
time of the interrogation. (Pages 152 and 153, Trial Record.) Appellant's brief, pages 6 and 7, quoting from the
trial record, contain this discussion and Officer Fillis'
statement. Further on, in re-direct examination of the
officer, his explanation of what he meant by the statement
is related. See page 160 of the trial record. The statement
of the officer, even if misunderstood, is not of such a threatening nature as to have reasonably caused the defendant
to fear and confess. Defendant did not testify that he was
put in fear or that he understood the statement to be a
threat.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of the
trial court should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CALLISTER,
Attorney General,
GARY L. THEURER,
Assistant Attorney General,
Attorneys for Respondent.
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